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Abstract. We consider repeated multiplayer games in which players repeatedly and simultane-
ously choose strategies from a ﬁnite set of available strategies according to some strategy adjustment
process. We focus on the speciﬁc class of weakly acyclic games, which is particularly relevant for
multiagent cooperative control problems. A strategy adjustment process determines how players
select their strategies at any stage as a function of the information gathered over previous stages.
Of particular interest are “payoﬀ-based” processes in which, at any stage, players know only their
own actions and (noise corrupted) payoﬀs from previous stages. In particular, players do not know
the actions taken by other players and do not know the structural form of payoﬀ functions. We
introduce three diﬀerent payoﬀ-based processes for increasingly general scenarios and prove that,
after a suﬃciently large number of stages, player actions constitute a Nash equilibrium at any stage
with arbitrarily high probability. We also show how to modify player utility functions through tolls
and incentives in so-called congestion games, a special class of weakly acyclic games, to guarantee
that a centralized objective can be realized as a Nash equilibrium. We illustrate the methods with a
simulation of distributed routing over a network.
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1. Introduction. The objective in distributed cooperative control for multi-
agent systems is to enable a collection of “self-interested” agents to achieve a desirable
“collective” objective. There are two overriding challenges to achieving this objective.
The ﬁrst is complexity. Finding an optimal solution by a centralized algorithm may
be prohibitively diﬃcult when there are large numbers of interacting agents. This mo-
tivates the use of adaptive methods that enable agents to “self-organize” into suitable,
if not optimal, collective solutions.
The second challenge is limited information. Agents may have limited knowledge
about the status of other agents, except perhaps for a small subset of “neighboring”
agents. An example is collective motion control for mobile sensor platforms (see, e.g.,
[7]). In these problems, mobile sensors seek to position themselves to achieve various
collective objectives such as rendezvous or area coverage. Sensors can communicate
with neighboring sensors, but otherwise they do not have global knowledge of the
domain of operation or the status and locations of nonneighboring sensors.
A typical assumption is that agents are endowed with a reward or utility function
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that depends on their own strategies and the strategies of other agents. In motion
coordination problems, for example, an agent’s utility function typically depends on
its position relative to other agents or environmental targets, and knowledge of this
function guides local motion adjustments.
In other situations, agents may know nothing about the structure of their utility
functions and how their own utility depends on the actions of other agents (whether
local or far away). In this case, the only course of action is to observe rewards
based on experience and “optimize” on a trial and error basis. The situation is
further complicated because all agents are trying simultaneously to optimize their
own strategies. Therefore, even in the absence of noise, an agent trying the same
strategy twice may see diﬀerent results because of the nonstationary nature of the
strategies of other agents.
There are several examples of multiagent systems that illustrate this situation.
In distributed routing for ad hoc data networks (see, e.g., [2]), routing nodes seek to
route packets to neighboring nodes based on packet destinations without knowledge
of the overall network structure. The objective is to minimize the delay of packets
to their destinations. This delay must be realized through trial and error, since
the functional dependence of delay on routing strategies is not known. A similar
problem is automotive traﬃc routing, in which drivers seek to minimize the congestion
experienced to reach a desired destination. Drivers can experience the congestion on
selected routes as a function of the routes selected by other drivers, but drivers do not
know the structure of the congestion function. Finally, in a multiagent approach to
designing manufacturing systems (see, e.g., [9]), it may not be known in advance how
performance measures (such as throughput) depend on manufacturing policy. Rather,
performance can only be measured once a policy is implemented.
Our interest in this paper is to develop algorithms that enable coordination in mul-
tiagent systems for precisely this “payoﬀ-based” scenario, in which agents only have
access to (possibly noisy) measurements of the rewards received through repeated
interactions with other agents. We adopt the framework of “learning in games.” (See
[5, 10, 25, 26] for an extensive overview. See also the recent special issue containing [22]
or survey article [18] for perspectives from machine learning.) Unlike most of the learn-
ing rules in this literature, which assume that agents adjust their behavior based on the
observed behavior of other agents, we shall assume that agents know only their own
past actions and the payoﬀs that resulted. It is far from obvious that Nash equilibrium
can be achieved under such a restriction, but in fact it has recently been shown that
such “payoﬀ-based” learning rules can be constructed that work in any game [4, 8].
In this paper we show that there are simpler and more intuitive adjustment rules
that achieve this objective for a large class of multiplayer games known as “weakly
acyclic” games. This class captures many problems of interest in cooperative control
[13, 14]. It includes the very special case of “identical interest” games, where each
agent receives the same reward. However, weakly acyclic games (and the related
concept of potential games) capture other scenarios such as congestion games [19] and
similar problems such as distributed routing in networks, weapon target assignment,
consensus, and area coverage. See [15, 1] and references therein for a discussion of a
learning in games approach to cooperative control problems, but under less stringent
assumptions on informational constraints than considered in this paper.
For many multiagent problems, operation at a pure Nash equilibrium may reﬂect
optimization of a collective objective.1 We will derive payoﬀ-based dynamics that
1Nonetheless, there are varied viewpoints on the role of Nash equilibrium as a solution concept
for multiagent systems. See [22] and [12].
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guarantee asymptotically that agent strategies will constitute a pure Nash equilibrium
with arbitrarily high probability. It need not always be the case that at least one Nash
equilibrium optimizes a collective objective. Motivated by this consideration, we also
discuss the introduction of incentives or tolls in a player’s payoﬀ function to assure
that there is at least one Nash equilibrium that optimizes a collective objective. Even
in this case, however, there may still be suboptimal Nash equilibria.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides back-
ground on ﬁnite strategic-form games and repeated games. This is followed by three
types of payoﬀ-based dynamics in section 3 for increasingly general problems. Sub-
section 3.1 presents “safe experimentation dynamics” which is restricted to identical
interest games. Subsection 3.2 presents “simple experimentation dynamics” for the
more general class of weakly acyclic games but with noise-free payoﬀ measurements.
Subsection 3.3 presents “sample experimentation dynamics” for weakly acyclic games
with noisy payoﬀ measurements. Section 4 discusses how to introduce tolls and in-
centives in payoﬀs so that a Nash equilibrium optimizes a collective objective. Sec-
tion 5 presents an illustrative example of a traﬃc congestion game. Finally, section 6
contains some concluding remarks. An important analytical tool throughout is the
method of resistance trees for perturbed Markov chains [24], which is reviewed in an
appendix.
2. Background. In this section, we will present a brief background of the game
theoretic concepts used in the paper. We refer the readers to [6, 25, 26] for a more
comprehensive review.
2.1. Finite strategic-form games. Consider a ﬁnite strategic-form game with
n-player set P := {P1, . . . ,Pn} where each player Pi ∈ P has a ﬁnite action set Ai
and a utility function Ui : A → R where A = A1 × · · · × An. We will sometimes use
a single symbol, e.g., G, to represent the entire game, i.e., the player set, P , action
sets, Ai, and utility functions Ui.
For an action proﬁle a = (a1, a2, . . . , an) ∈ A, let a−i denote the proﬁle of player
actions other than player Pi, i.e.,
a−i = {a1, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , an} .
With this notation, we will sometimes write a proﬁle a of actions as (ai, a−i). Similarly,
we may write Ui(a) as Ui(ai, a−i).
An action proﬁle a∗ ∈ A is called a pure Nash equilibrium if for all players Pi ∈ P ,
(2.1) Ui(a∗i , a
∗
−i) = max
ai∈Ai
Ui(ai, a∗−i).
Furthermore, if the above condition is satisﬁed with a unique maximizer for every
player Pi ∈ P , then a∗ is called a strict (Nash) equilibrium.
In this paper we will consider three classes of games: identical interest games,
potential games, and weakly acyclic games. Each class of games has a connection
to general cooperative control problems and multiagent systems for which there is
some global utility or potential function φ : A → R that a global planner seeks to
maximize [13].
2.1.1. Identical interest games. The most restrictive class of games that we
will review in this paper is identical interest games. In such a game, the players’ utility
functions {Ui}ni=1 are chosen to be the same. That is, for some function φ : A → R,
Ui(a) = φ(a)
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for every Pi ∈ P and for every a ∈ A. It is easy to verify that all identical interest
games have at least one pure Nash equilibrium, namely, any action proﬁle a that
maximizes φ(a).
2.1.2. Potential games. A signiﬁcant generalization of an identical interest
game is a potential game. In a potential game, the change in a player’s utility that
results from a unilateral change in strategy equals the change in the global utility.
Speciﬁcally, there is a function φ : A → R such that for every player Pi ∈ P , for every
a−i ∈ A−i, and for every a′i, a′′i ∈ Ai,
Ui(a′i, a−i)− Ui(a′′i , a−i) = φ(a′i, a−i)− φ(a′′i , a−i).
When this condition is satisﬁed, the game is called an exact potential game with
the potential function φ.2 It is easy to see that, in potential games, any action
proﬁle maximizing the potential function is a pure Nash equilibrium, and hence every
potential game possesses at least one such equilibrium. An example of an exact
potential game is illustrated in Figure 1.
L R
U 0, 0 −1, 1
D 1,−1 0, 0
Payoﬀs
L R
U 0 1
D 1 2
Potential
Fig. 1. An example of a two player exact potential game.
2.1.3. Weakly acyclic games. Consider any ﬁnite game G with a set A of
action proﬁles. A better reply path is a sequence of action proﬁles a1, a2, . . . , aL such
that for each successive pair aj , aj+1 there is exactly one player such that aji = aj+1i
and for that player Ui(aj+1) > Ui(aj). In other words, one player moves at a time,
and each time a player moves he increases his own utility.
Suppose now that G is a potential game with potential function φ. Starting from
an arbitrary action proﬁle a ∈ A, construct a better reply path a = a1, a2, . . . , aL
until it can no longer be extended. Note ﬁrst that such a path cannot cycle back
on itself, because φ is strictly increasing along the path. Since A is ﬁnite, the path
cannot be extended indeﬁnitely. Hence, the last element in a maximal better reply
path from any joint action, a, must be a Nash equilibrium of G.
This idea may be generalized as follows. The game G is weakly acyclic if for any
a ∈ A, there exists a better reply path starting at a and ending at some pure Nash
equilibrium of G [25, 26]. Potential games are special cases of weakly acyclic games.
An example of a two player weakly acyclic game is illustrated in Figure 2. Notice
that the illustrated game is not a potential game.
2.2. Repeated games. In a repeated game, at each time t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, each
player Pi ∈ P simultaneously chooses an action ai(t) ∈ Ai and receives the utility
Ui(a(t)), where a(t) := (a1(t), . . . , an(t)). Each player Pi ∈ P chooses action ai(t)
at time t according to a probability distribution pi(t), which we will refer to as the
2There are weaker notions of potential games such as ordinal or weighted potential games. Rather
than discuss each variation speciﬁcally, we will discuss a more general framework, weakly acyclic
games, in the ensuing section. Any potential game, whether exact, ordinal, or weighted, is a weakly
acyclic game.
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L C R
U 0, 0 0.1, 0 1, 1
M 1, 0 0, 1 0, 0
D 0, 1 1, 0 0, 0
Fig. 2. An example of a two player weakly acyclic game.
strategy of player Pi at time t. A player’s strategy at time t can rely only on ob-
servations from times {0, 1, 2, . . . , t − 1}. Diﬀerent learning algorithms are speciﬁed
by both the assumptions on available information and the mechanism by which the
strategies are updated as information is gathered. For example, if a player knows the
functional form of his utility function and is capable of observing the actions of all
other players at every time step, then the strategy adjustment mechanism of player
Pi can be written in the general form
pi(t) = Fi
(
a(0), . . . , a(t− 1);Ui
)
.
An example of a learning algorithm, or strategy adjustment mechanism, of this form
is the well-known ﬁctitious play [16]. For a detailed review of learning in games, we
direct the reader to [5, 25, 26, 11, 23, 20].
In this paper we deal with the issue of whether players can learn to play a pure
Nash equilibrium through repeated interactions under the most restrictive observa-
tional conditions; players only have access to (i) the action they played and (ii) the
utility (possibly noisy) they received. In this setting, the strategy adjustment mech-
anism of player Pi takes on the form
(2.2) pi(t) = Fi
({ai(0), Ui(a(0)) + νi(0)}, . . . , {ai(t− 1), Ui(a(t− 1)) + νi(t− 1)}),
where the νi(t) are zero mean independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random
variables.
3. Payoﬀ-based learning algorithms. In this section, we will introduce three
simple payoﬀ-based learning algorithms. The ﬁrst, called safe experimentation, guar-
antees convergence to a pure optimal Nash equilibrium in any identical interest game.
Such an equilibrium is optimal because each player’s utility is maximized. The second
learning algorithm, called simple experimentation, guarantees convergence to a pure
Nash equilibrium in any weakly acyclic game. The third learning algorithm, called
sample experimentation, guarantees convergence to a pure Nash equilibrium in any
weakly acyclic game even when utility measurements are corrupted with noise.
3.1. Safe experimentation dynamics for identical interest games.
3.1.1. Constant exploration rates. Before introducing the learning dynam-
ics, we introduce the following function. Let
Umaxi (t) := max
0≤τ≤t−1
Ui(a(τ))
be the maximum utility that player Pi has received up to time t− 1.
We will now introduce the safe experimentation dynamics for identical interest
games.
1. Initialization: At time t = 0, each player randomly selects and plays any
action, ai(0). This action will be initially set as the player’s baseline action
at time t = 1 and is denoted by abi (1) = ai(0).
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2. Action selection: At each subsequent time step, each player selects his
baseline action with probability (1 − ) or experiments with a new random
action with probability , i.e.,
• ai(t) = abi (t) with probability (1− );
• ai(t) is chosen randomly (uniformly) over Ai with probability .
The variable  will be referred to as the player’s exploration rate.
3. Baseline strategy update: Each player compares the actual utility re-
ceived, Ui(a(t)), with the maximum received utility Umaxi (t) and updates the
baseline action as follows:
abi (t + 1) =
{
ai(t), Ui(a(t)) > Umaxi (t),
abi(t), Ui(a(t)) ≤ Umaxi (t).
Each player updates the maximum received utility regardless of whether or
not step 2 involved exploration.
4. Return to step 2 and repeat.
The reason that this learning algorithm is called “safe” experimentation is that
the utility evaluated at the baseline action, U(ab(t)), is nondecreasing with respect to
time.
Theorem 3.1. Let G be a ﬁnite n-player identical interest game in which all
players use the safe experimentation dynamics. Given any probability p < 1, if the
exploration rate  > 0 is suﬃciently small, then for all suﬃciently large times t, a(t)
is an optimal Nash equilibrium of G with at least probability p.
Proof. Since G is an identical interest game, let the utility of each player be
expressed as U : A → R, and let A∗ be the set of “optimal” Nash equilibria of G, i.e.,
A∗ =
{
a∗ ∈ A : U(a∗) = max
a∈A
U(a)
}
.
For any joint action, a(t), the ensuing joint action will constitute an optimal Nash
equilibrium with at least probability(

|A1|
)(

|A2|
)
· · ·
(

|An|
)
,
where |Ai| denotes the cardinality of the action set of player Pi. Therefore, an optimal
Nash equilibrium will eventually be played with probability 1 for any  > 0.
Suppose an optimal Nash equilibrium is ﬁrst played at time t∗, i.e., a(t∗) ∈ A∗
and a(t∗ − 1) /∈ A∗. Then the baseline joint action must remain constant from that
time onwards, i.e., ab(t) = a(t∗) for all t > t∗. An optimal Nash equilibrium will then
be played at any time t > t∗ with at least probability (1 − )n. Since  > 0 can be
chosen arbitrarily small, and in particular such that (1− )n > p, this completes the
proof.
3.1.2. Diminishing exploration rates. In the safe experimentation dynamics,
the exploration rate  was deﬁned as a constant. Alternatively, one could let the
exploration rate vary to induce desirable behavior. One example would be to let the
exploration rate decay, such as t = (1/t)1/n. This would induce exploration at early
stages and reduce exploration at later stages of the game. The theorem and proof
hold under the following conditions for the exploration rate:
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lim
t→∞ t = 0,
lim
t→∞
t∏
τ=1
[
1−
(
τ
|A1|
)(
τ
|A2|
)
· · ·
(
τ
|An|
)]
= 0.
3.2. Simple experimentation dynamics for weakly acyclic games. We
will now introduce the simple experimentation dynamics for weakly acyclic games.
These dynamics will allow us to relax the assumption of identical interest games.
1. Initialization: At time t = 0, each player randomly selects and plays any
action, ai(0). This action will be initially set as the player’s baseline action
at time 1, i.e., abi(1) = ai(0). Likewise, the player’s baseline utility at time 1
is initialized as ubi(1) = Ui(a(0)).
2. Action selection: At each subsequent time step, each player selects a base-
line action with probability (1− ) or experiments with a new random action
with probability , i.e.,
• ai(t) = abi (t) with probability (1− );
• ai(t) is chosen randomly (uniformly) over Ai with probability .
The variable  will be referred to as the player’s exploration rate. Whenever
ai(t) = abi(t), we will say that player Pi experimented.
3. Baseline action and baseline utility update: Each player compares
the utility received, Ui(a(t)), with his baseline utility, ubi(t), and updates his
baseline action and utility as follows:
• If player Pi experimented (i.e., ai(t) = abi(t)) and if Ui(a(t)) > ubi(t),
then
abi(t + 1) = ai(t),
ubi(t + 1) = Ui(a(t)).
• If player Pi experimented and if Ui(a(t)) ≤ ubi(t), then
abi(t + 1) = a
b
i(t),
ubi(t + 1) = u
b
i(t).
• If player Pi did not experiment (i.e., ai(t) = abi (t)), then
abi(t + 1) = a
b
i(t),
ubi(t + 1) = Ui(a(t)).
4. Return to step 2 and repeat.
As before, these dynamics require only utility measurements and hence almost no
information regarding the structure of the game.
Theorem 3.2. Let G be a ﬁnite n-player weakly acyclic game in which all play-
ers use the simple experimentation dynamics. Given any probability p < 1, if the
exploration rate  > 0 is suﬃciently small, then for all suﬃciently large times t, a(t)
is a Nash equilibrium of G with at least probability p.
The remainder of this subsection is devoted to the proof of Theorem 3.2. The
proof relies on the theory of resistance trees for perturbed Markov chains (see the
appendix for a brief review).
Deﬁne the state of the dynamics to be the pair [a, u], where a is the baseline joint
action and u is the baseline utility vector. We will omit the superscript b to avoid
cumbersome notation.
Partition the state space into the following three sets. First, let X be the set of
states [a, u] such that ui = Ui(a) for at least one player Pi. Let E be the set of states
[a, u] such that ui = Ui(a) for all players Pi and a is a Nash equilibrium. Let D be
the set of states [a, u] such that ui = Ui(a) for all players Pi and a is a disequilibrium
(not a Nash equilibrium). These are all the states.
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Claim 3.1.
(a) Any state [a, u] ∈ X transitions to a state in E ∪ D in one period with
probability O(1).
(b) Any state [a, u] ∈ E∪D transitions to a diﬀerent state [a′, u′] with probability
at most O(ε).
Proof. For any [a, u′] ∈ X , there exists at least one player Pi such that u′i =
Ui(a). If all players repeat their part of the joint action proﬁle a, which occurs with
probability (1−)n, then [a, u′] transitions to [a, u], where ui = Ui(a) for all players Pi.
Thus the process moves to [a, u] ∈ E ∪D with prob O(1). This proves statement (a).
As for statement (b), any state in E ∪D transitions back to itself whenever no player
experiments, which occurs with probability at least O(1).
Claim 3.2. For any state [a, u] ∈ D, there is a ﬁnite sequence of transitions to
a state [a∗, u∗] ∈ E, where the transitions have the form3
[a, u] →
O()
[a1, u1] →
O()
· · · →
O()
[a∗, u∗],
where uki = Ui(a
k) for all i and for all k > 0, and each transition occurs with proba-
bility O().
Proof. Such a sequence is guaranteed by weak acyclicity. Since a is not an equilib-
rium, there is a better reply path from a to some equilibrium a∗, say a, a1, a2, . . . , a∗.
At [a, u] the appropriate player Pi experiments with probability  and chooses the
appropriate better reply with probability 1/|Ai|, and no one else experiments. Thus
the process moves to [a1, u1], where u1i = Ui(a
1) for all players Pi with probability
O() (more precisely, O((1−)n−1)). Notice that for the deviator Pi, Ui(a1) > Ui(a),
and therefore u1i = Ui(a
1). For the nondeviator, say, player Pj , u1j = Uj(a1) since
a1j = aj. Thus [a
1, u1] ∈ D ∪ E. In the next period, the appropriate player deviates,
and so forth.
Claim 3.3. For any equilibrium [a∗, u∗] ∈ E, any path from [a∗, u∗] to another
state [a, u] ∈ E ∪ D, a = a∗, that does not loop back to [a∗, u∗] must be one of the
following two forms:
(1) [a∗, u∗] →
O()
[a∗, u′] →
O(k)
[a′, u′′] → · · · → [a, u], where k ≥ 1;
(2) [a∗, u∗] →
O(k)
[a′, u′′] → · · · → [a, u], where k ≥ 2.
Proof. The path must begin by either one player experimenting or more that one
player experimenting. Case (2) results if more than one player experiments. Case (1)
results if exactly one agent, say, agent Pi, experiments with an action a′i = a∗i and
all other players continue to play their part of a∗. This happens with probability
(/|Ai|)(1 − )n−1. In this situation, player Pi cannot be better oﬀ, meaning that
Ui(a′i, a
∗
−i) ≤ Ui(a∗), since by assumption a∗ is an equilibrium. Hence the baseline
action next period remains a∗ for all players, though their baseline utilities may
change. Denote the next state by [a∗, u′]. If in the subsequent period all players
continue to play their part of the action a∗, which occurs with probability (1 − )n,
then the state reverts back to [a∗, u∗] and we have a loop. Hence, the only way the
path can continue without a loop is for one or more players to experiment in the next
stage, which has probability O(k), k ≥ 1. This is exactly what case (1) alleges.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. This is a ﬁnite aperiodic Markov process on the state space
A × U¯1 × · · · × U¯n, where U¯i denotes the (ﬁnite) range of Ui(·). Furthermore, from
3We will use the notation z → z′ to denote the transition from state z to state z′. We use
z →
O()
z′ to emphasize that this transition occurs with probability of order .
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every state there exists a positive probability path to a Nash equilibrium. Hence, every
recurrent class has at least one Nash equilibrium. We will now show that within any
recurrent class, the trees (see the appendix) rooted at the Nash equilibrium will have
the lowest resistance. Therefore, according to Theorem A.1, the a priori probability
that the state will be a Nash equilibrium can be made arbitrarily close to 1.
In order to apply Theorem A.1, we will construct minimum resistance trees with
vertices consisting of every possible state (within a recurrence class). Each edge
will have resistance 0, 1, 2, . . . associated with the transition probabilities O(1), O(),
O(2), . . . , respectively.
Our analysis will deviate slightly from the presentation in the appendix. In the
discussion in the appendix, the vertices of minimum resistance trees are recurrence
classes of an associated unperturbed Markov chain. In this case, the unperturbed
Markov chain corresponds to simple experimentation dynamics with  = 0, and so the
recurrence classes are all states in E ∪ D. Nonetheless, we will construct resistance
trees with the vertices being all possible states, i.e., E ∪D ∪X . The resulting con-
clusions remain the same (see Lemma 1 in [24]). Since the states in X are transient
with probability O(1), the resistance to leave a node corresponding to a state in X
is 0. Therefore, the presence of such states does not aﬀect the conclusions determining
which states are stochastically stable.
Suppose a minimum resistance tree T is rooted at a vertex v that is not in E. If
v ∈ X , it is easy to construct a new tree that has lower resistance. Namely, by Claim
3.1(a), there is a zero-resistance one-hop path P from v to some state [a, u] ∈ E ∪D.
Add the edge of P to T and subtract the edge in T that exits from the vertex [a, u].
This results in a [a, u]-tree T ′. It has lower resistance than T because the added edge
has zero resistance, while the subtracted edge has resistance greater than or equal
to 1 because of Claim 3.1(b). This argument is illustrated in Figure 3, where the edge
of strictly positive resistance (R ≥ 1) is removed and replaced with the edge of zero
resistance (R = 0).
[a, u'']
[a, u'] [a, u]
[a', u][a', u']
[a, u'']
[a, u'] [a, u]
[a', u][a', u']
R > 1
R = 0
Original Tree T (Rooted in X) Revised Tree T' (Rooted in D or E)
Fig. 3. Construction of alternative to tree rooted in X.
Suppose next that v = [a, u] ∈ D but not in E. Construct a path P as in Claim 3.2
from [a, u] to some state [a∗, u∗] ∈ E. As above, construct a new tree T ′ rooted at
[a∗, u∗] by adding the edges of P to T and taking out the redundant edges (the edges
in T that exit from the vertices in P ). The nature of the path P guarantees that the
edges taken out have total resistance at least as high as the resistances of the edges
put in. This is because the entire path P lies in E ∪D, each transition on the path
has resistance 1, and, from Claim 3.2(b), the resistance to leave any state in E ∪D is
at least 1.
To construct a new tree that has strictly lower resistance, we will inspect the
eﬀect of removing the exiting edge from [a∗, u∗] in T . Note that this edge must ﬁt
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either case (1) or (2) of Claim 3.3.
In case (2), the resistance of the exiting edge is at least 2, which is larger than
any edge in P . Hence the new tree has strictly lower resistance than T , which is a
contradiction. This argument is illustrated in Figure 4. A new path is created from
the original root [a, u] ∈ D to the equilibrium [a∗, u∗] ∈ E (R = 1 edges). Redundant
(R ≥ 1, R ≥ 2) edges emanating from the new path are removed. In case (2), the
redundant edge emanating from [a∗, u∗] has a resistance of at least 2.
[a', u'']
[a, u]
[a*, u*]
[a', u']
[a*, u'][a'', u'']
[a, u']
[a, u'']
[a', u'']
[a, u]
[a*, u*]
[a', u']
[a*, u'][a'', u'']
[a, u']
[a, u'']
R = 1
R = 1
R = 1
R > 1
R > 1
R > 2
Original Tree T (Rooted in D - Case 2) Revised Tree T' (Rooted in E)
Fig. 4. Construction of alternative to tree rooted in D for case (2).
In case (1), the exiting edge has the form [a∗, u∗] → [a∗, u′] which has resistance 1
where u∗ = u′. The next edge in T , say, [a∗, u′] → [a′, u′′], also has at least resistance 1.
Remove the edge [a∗, u′] → [a′, u′′] from T , and put in the edge [a∗, u′] → [a∗, u∗].
The latter has resistance 0 since [a∗, u′] ∈ X . This results in a tree T ′′ that is rooted
at [a∗, u∗] and has strictly lower resistance than does T , which is a contradiction. This
argument is illustrated in Figure 5. As in Figure 4, a new (R = 1, R = 0) path is
constructed and redundant (R ≥ 1, R = 1) edges are removed. The diﬀerence is that
the edge [a∗, u′] → [a′, u′′] is removed and replaced with [a∗, u′] → [a∗, u∗].
To recap, a minimum resistance tree cannot be rooted at any state in X or D,
but rather only at a state in in E. Therefore, when  is suﬃciently small, the long-run
probability on E can be made arbitrarily close to 1, and in particular, larger than any
speciﬁed probability p.
3.3. Sample experimentation dynamics for weakly acyclic games with
noisy utility measurements.
3.3.1. Noise-free utility measurements. In this section we will focus on de-
veloping payoﬀ-based dynamics for which the limiting behavior exhibits that of a pure
Nash equilibrium with arbitrarily high probability in any ﬁnite weakly acyclic game
even in the presence of utility noise. We will show that a variant of the so-called
regret testing algorithm [4] accomplishes this objective for weakly acyclic games with
noisy utility measurements.
We now introduce sample experimentation dynamics.
1. Initialization: At time t = 0, each player randomly selects and plays any
action, ai(0) ∈ Ai. This action will be initially set as each player’s baseline
action, abi(1) = ai(0).
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[a', u'']
[a, u]
[a*, u*]
[a', u']
[a*, u'][a'', u'']
[a, u']
[a, u'']
[a', u'']
[a, u]
[a*, u*]
[a', u']
[a*, u'][a'', u'']
[a, u']
[a, u'']
R = 0
R = 1
R = 1
R = 1
R = 1
R > 1
R > 1
R > 1
Original Tree T (Rooted in D - Case 1) Revised Tree T' (Rooted in E)
Fig. 5. Construction of alternative to tree rooted in D for case (1).
2. Exploration phase: After the baseline action is set, each player engages in
an exploration phase over the next m periods. The exploration phases need
not be synchronized or of the same length for each player, but we will assume
that they are for the proof. For convenience, we will double index the time
of the actions played as
aˇ(t1, t2) = a(mt1 + t2),
where t1 indexes the number of the exploration phase and t2 indexes the
actions played in that exploration phase. We will refer to t1 as the exploration
phase time and to t2 as the exploration action time. By construction, the
exploration phase time and exploration action time satisfy t1 ≥ 1 and m ≥
t2 ≥ 1, respectively. The baseline action will be updated only at the end of
the exploration phase and will therefore be indexed only by the exploration
phase time.
During the exploration phase, each player selects a baseline action with prob-
ability (1− ) or experiments with a new random action with probability .
That is, for any exploration phase time t1 ≥ 1 and for any exploration action
time satisfying m ≥ t2 ≥ 1,
• aˇi(t1, t2) = abi(t1) with probability (1− ),
• aˇi(t1, t2) is chosen randomly (uniformly) over (Ai \ abi(t1)) with proba-
bility .
Again, the variable  will be referred to as the player’s exploration rate.
3. Action assessment: After the exploration phase, each player evaluates the
average utility received when playing each of his actions during the explo-
ration phase. Let naii (t1) be the number of times that player Pi played action
ai during the exploration phase at time t1. The average utility for action ai
during the exploration phase at time t1 is
Vˆ aii (t1) =
{
1
n
ai
i (t1)
∑m
t2=1
I{ai = aˇi(t1, t2)}Ui(aˇ(t1, t2)), naii (t1) > 0,
Umin, n
ai
i (t1) = 0,
where I{·} is the usual indicator function and Umin satisﬁes
Umin < min
i
min
a∈A
Ui(a).
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In other words, Umin is less than the smallest payoﬀ any agent can receive.
4. Evaluation of better response set: Each player compares the average
utility received when playing a baseline action, Vˆ a
b
i (t)
i (t1), with the average
utility received for each of the other actions, Vˆ aii (t1), and ﬁnds all played
actions which performed δ better than the baseline action. The term δ will
be referred to as the players’ tolerance level. Deﬁne A∗i (t1) to be the set of
actions that outperformed the baseline action as follows:
(3.1) A∗i (t1) =
{
ai ∈ Ai : Vˆ aii (t1) ≥ Vˆ a
b
i (t1)
i (t1) + δ
}
.
5. Baseline strategy update: Each player updates a baseline action as fol-
lows:
• If A∗i (t1) = ∅, then abi(t1 + 1) = abi(t1).
• If A∗i (t1) = ∅, then
– with probability ω, set abi (t1 + 1) = a
b
i(t1). (We will refer to ω as
the player’s inertia.)
– with probability 1 − ω, randomly select abi(t1 + 1) ∈ A∗i (t1) with
uniform probability.
6. Return to step 2 and repeat.
For simplicity, we will ﬁrst state and prove the desired convergence properties
using noiseless utility measurements. The setup for the noisy utility measurements
will be stated afterwards.
Before stating the following theorem, we deﬁne the constant α > 0 as follows.
If Ui(a1) = Ui(a2) for any joint actions a1, a2 ∈ A and any player Pi ∈ P , then
|Ui(a1) − Ui(a2)| > α. In other words, if any two joint actions result in diﬀerent
utilities at all, then the diﬀerence would be at least α.
Theorem 3.3. Let G be a ﬁnite n-player weakly acyclic game in which all players
use the sample experimentation dynamics. For any
• probability p < 1,
• tolerance level δ ∈ (0, α),
• inertia ω ∈ (0, 1), and
• exploration rate  satisfying min{(α− δ)/4, δ/4, 1− p} > (1− (1− )n) > 0,
if the exploration phase length m is suﬃciently large, then for all suﬃciently large
times t > 0, a(t) is a Nash equilibrium of G with at least probability p.
The remainder of this subsection is devoted to the proof of Theorem 3.3.
We will assume for simplicity that utilities are between −1/2 and 1/2, i.e.,
|Ui(a)| ≤ 1/2 for any player Pi ∈ P and any joint action a ∈ A.
We begin with a series of useful claims. The ﬁrst claim states that for any player
Pi the average utility for an action ai ∈ Ai during the exploration phase can be made
arbitrarily close (with high probability) to the actual utility the player would have
received provided that all other players never experimented. This can be accomplished
if the experimentation rate is suﬃciently small and the exploration phase length is
suﬃciently large.
Claim 3.4. Let ab be the joint baseline action at the start of an exploration phase
of length m. For
• any probability p < 1,
• any δ∗ > 0, and
• any exploration rate  > 0 satisfying δ∗/2 ≥ (1 − (1− )n−1) > 0,
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if the exploration phase length m is suﬃciently large, then
Pr
[∣∣Vˆ aii − Ui(ai, ab−i)∣∣ > δ∗] < 1− p.
Proof. Let ni(ai) represent the number of times player Pi played action ai during
the exploration phase. In the following discussion, all probabilities and expectations
are conditioned on ni(ai) > 0. We omit making this explicit for the sake of notational
simplicity. The event ni(ai) = 0 has diminishing probability as the exploration phase
length m increases, and so this case will not aﬀect the desired conclusions for increasing
phase lengths.
For an arbitrary δ∗ > 0,
Pr
[∣∣Vˆ aii − Ui(ai, ab−i)∣∣ > δ∗]
≤ Pr
[∣∣Vˆ aii − E{Vˆ aii }∣∣+ ∣∣E{Vˆ aii } − Ui(ai, ab−i)∣∣ > δ∗]
≤ Pr
[∣∣Vˆ aii − E{Vˆ aii }∣∣ > δ∗/2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(∗)
+Pr
[∣∣E{Vˆ aii } − Ui(ai, ab−i)∣∣ > δ∗/2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(∗∗)
.
First, let us focus on (∗∗). We have
E{Vˆ aii }−Ui(ai, ab−i) = [1− (1− )n−1]
[
E{Ui(ai, a−i(t)) | a−i(t) = ab−i}−Ui(ai, ab)
]
,
which approaches 0 as  ↓ 0. Therefore, for any exploration rate  satisfying δ∗/2 >
(1− (1 − )n−1) > 0, we know that
Pr
[∣∣E{Vˆ aii } − Ui(ai, ab−i)∣∣ > δ∗/2] = 0.
Now we will focus on (∗). By the weak law of large numbers, (∗) approaches 0 as
ni(ai) ↑ ∞. This implies that for any probability p¯ < 1 and any exploration rate
 > 0, there exists a sample size n∗i (ai) such that if ni(ai) > n
∗
i (ai), then
Pr
[∣∣Vˆ aii − E{Vˆ aii }∣∣ > ρ/2] < 1− p¯.
Lastly, for any probability p¯ < 1 and any ﬁxed exploration rate, there exists a mini-
mum exploration length m > 0 such that for any exploration length m > m,
Pr [ni(ai) ≥ n∗i (ai)] ≥ p¯.
In summary, for any ﬁxed exploration rate  satisfying δ∗/2 ≥ (1 − (1 − )n−1) > 0,
(∗) + (∗∗) can be made arbitrarily close to 0, provided that the exploration length m
is suﬃciently large.
Claim 3.5. Let ab be the joint baseline action at the start of an exploration phase
of length m. For any
• probability p < 1,
• tolerance level δ ∈ (0, α), and
• exploration rate  > 0 satisfying min{(α− δ)/4, δ/4} ≥ (1− (1− )n−1) > 0,
if the exploration length m is suﬃciently large, then each player’s better response set
A∗i will contain only and all actions that are a better response to the joint baseline
action, i.e.,
a∗i ∈ A∗i ⇔ Ui(a∗i , ab−i) > Ui(ab)
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with at least probability p.
Proof. Suppose ab is not a Nash equilibrium. For some player Pi ∈ P , let a∗i be
a strict better reply to the baseline joint action, i.e., Ui(a∗i , a
b
−i) > Ui(a
b), and let awi
be a nonbetter reply to the baseline joint action, i.e., Ui(awi , a
b
−i) ≤ Ui(ab).
Using Claim 3.4, for any probability p¯ < 1 and any exploration rate  > 0 satis-
fying min{(α− δ)/4, δ/4} ≥ (1− (1− )n−1) > 0 there exists a minimum exploration
length m > 0 such that for any exploration length m > m the following expressions
are true:
Pr
[
|Vˆ abii − Ui(abi , ab−i)| < δ∗
]
≥ p¯,(3.2)
Pr
[
|Vˆ a∗ii − Ui(a∗i , ab−i)| < δ∗
]
≥ p¯,(3.3)
Pr
[
|Vˆ awii − Ui(awi , ab−i)| < δ∗
]
≥ p¯,(3.4)
where δ∗ = min{(α− δ)/2, δ/2}. Rewriting (3.2), we obtain
Pr
[
|Vˆ abii − Ui(abi , ab−i)| < δ∗
]
≤ Pr
[
Vˆ
abi
i − Ui(abi , ab−i) < (α− δ)/2
]
,
and rewriting (3.3), we obtain
Pr
[
|Vˆ a∗ii − Ui(a∗i , ab−i)| < δ∗
]
≤ Pr
[
Vˆ
a∗i
i − Ui(a∗i , ab−i) > −(α− δ)/2
]
≤ Pr
[
Vˆ
a∗i
i − (Ui(abi , ab−i) + α) > −(α− δ)/2
]
= Pr
[
Vˆ
a∗i
i − Ui(abi , ab−i) > (α + δ)/2
]
,
meaning that
Pr [a∗i ∈ A∗i ] ≥ p¯2.
Similarly, rewriting (3.2), we obtain
Pr
[
|Vˆ abii − Ui(abi , ab−i)| < δ∗
]
≤ Pr
[
Vˆ
abi
i − Ui(abi , ab−i) > −δ/2
]
,
and rewriting (3.4), we obtain
Pr
[
|Vˆ awii − Ui(awi , ab−i)| < δ∗
]
≤ Pr
[
Vˆ
awi
i − Ui(awi , ab−i) < δ/2
]
≤ Pr
[
Vˆ
awi
i − Ui(abi , ab−i) < δ/2
]
,
meaning that
Pr [awi /∈ A∗i ] ≥ p¯2.
Since p¯ can be chosen arbitrarily close to 1, the proof is complete.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. The evolution of the baseline actions from phase to phase is
a ﬁnite aperiodic Markov process on the state space of joint actions, A. Furthermore,
since G is weakly acyclic, from every state there exists a better reply path to a Nash
equilibrium. Hence, every recurrent class has at least one Nash equilibrium. We
will show that these dynamics can be viewed as a perturbation of a certain Markov
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chain whose recurrent classes are restricted to Nash equilibria. We will then appeal
to Theorem A.1 to derive the desired result.
We begin by deﬁning an “unperturbed” process on baseline actions. For any
ab ∈ A, deﬁne the true better reply set as
A¯∗i (ab) =
{
ai : Ui(ai, ab−i) > Ui(a
b)
}
.
Now deﬁne the transition process from ab(t1) to ab(t1 + 1) as follows:
• If A¯∗i (ab(t1)) = ∅, then abi(t1 + 1) = abi(t1).
• If A¯∗i (ab(t1)) = ∅, then
– with probability ω, set abi (t1 + 1) = a
b
i(t1).
– with probability 1−ω, randomly select abi(t1+1) ∈ A¯∗i (t1) with uniform
probability.
This is a special case of a so-called “better reply process with ﬁnite memory and
inertia.” From [26, Theorem 6.2], the joint actions of this process converge to a Nash
equilibrium with probability 1 in any weakly acyclic game. Therefore, the recurrence
classes of this unperturbed are precisely the set of pure Nash equilibria.
The above unperturbed process closely resembles the baseline strategy update
process described in step 5 of sample experimentation dynamics. The diﬀerence is
that the above process uses the true better reply set, whereas step 5 uses a better
reply set constructed from experimentation over a phase. However, by Claim 3.5, for
any probability p¯ < 1, acceptable tolerance level δ, and acceptable exploration rate
, there exists a minimum exploration phase length m such that for any exploration
phase length m > m, each player’s better response set will contain only and all actions
that are a strict better response with at least probability p¯.
With parameters selected according to Claim 3.5, the transitions of the baseline
joint actions in sample experimentation dynamics follow that of the above unper-
turbed better reply process with probability p¯ arbitrarily close to 1. Since the recur-
rence classes of the unperturbed process are only Nash equilibria, we can conclude
from Theorem A.1 that as p¯ approaches 1, the probability that the baseline action for
suﬃciently large t1 will be a (pure) Nash equilibrium can be made arbitrarily close
to 1. By selecting the exploration probability  suﬃciently small, we can also conclude
that the joint action during exploration phases, i.e., a(mt1 + t2), will also be a Nash
equilibrium with probability arbitrarily close to 1.
3.3.2. Noisy utility measurements. Suppose that each player receives a noisy
measurement of his true utility, i.e.,
U˜i(ai, a−i) = Ui(ai, a−i) + νi,
where ni is an i.i.d. random variable with zero mean. In the regret testing algo-
rithm with noisy utility measurements, the average utility for action ai during the
exploration phase at time t1 is now
Vˆ aii (t1) =
{
1
n
ai
i (t1)
∑m
t2=1
I{ai = aˇi(t1, t2)}U˜i(aˇ(t1, t2)), naii (t1) > 0,
Umin, n
ai
i (t1) = 0.
A straightforward modiﬁcation of the proof of Theorem 3.3 leads to the following
theorem.
Theorem 3.4. Let G be a ﬁnite n-player weakly acyclic game where players’
utilities are corrupted with a zero mean noise process. If all players use the sample
experimentation dynamics, then for any
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• probability p < 1,
• tolerance level δ ∈ (0, α),
• inertia ω ∈ (0, 1), and
• exploration rate  satisfying min{(α− δ)/4, δ/4, 1− p} > (1− (1− )n) > 0,
if the exploration phase length m is suﬃciently large, then for all suﬃciently large
times t > 0, a(t) is a Nash equilibrium of G with at least probability p.
3.3.3. Comment on length and synchronization of players’ exploration
phases. In the proof of Theorem 3.3, we assumed that all players’ exploration phases
were synchronized and of the same length. This assumption was used to ensure that
when a player assessed the performance of a particular action, the baseline action of
the other players remained constant. Because of the players’ inertia this assumption
is unnecessary. The general idea is as follows: a player will repeat a baseline action
regardless of the better response set with positive probability because of the inertia.
Therefore, if all players repeat their baseline action a suﬃcient number of times,
which happens with positive probability, then the joint baseline action would remain
constant long enough for any player to evaluate an accurate better response set for
that particular joint baseline action.
4. Inﬂuencing Nash equilibria in resource allocation problems. In this
section we will derive an approach for inﬂuencing the Nash equilibria of a resource
allocation problem using the idea of marginal cost pricing. We will illustrate the setup
and our approach on a congestion game which is an example of a resource allocation
problem.
4.1. Congestion game setup. We consider a transportation network with a
ﬁnite set R of road segments (or resources) that needs to be shared by a set of selﬁsh
drivers labeled as D := {d1, . . . , dn}. Each driver has a ﬁxed origin/destination pair
connected through multiple routes. The set of all routes available to driver di is
denoted by Ai. A route ai ∈ Ai consists of multiple road segments, therefore, ai ⊂ R.
Player Pi taking route ai incurs a cost cr for each road segment r ∈ ai. The utility
of driver di taking route ai is deﬁned as the negative of the total cost incurred, i.e.,
Ui = −
∑
r∈ai cr. Of course, the utility of each driver will depend on the routes chosen
by other drivers.
If we assume that the cost incurred in a road segment depends only on the total
number of drivers sharing that road, then drivers are anonymous, and this leads to a
congestion game [19]. The utility of driver di is now stated more precisely as
Ui(a) = −
∑
r∈ai
cr(σr(a)),
where a := (a1, . . . , an) is the proﬁle of routes chosen by all drivers and σr(a) is the
total number of drivers using the road segment r.
It is known that a congestion game admits the following potential function:
φˆ(a) =
∑
r∈R
σr(a)∑
k=1
cr(k).
Unfortunately, this potential function lacks practical signiﬁcance for measuring the
eﬀectiveness of a routing strategy in terms of the overall congestion.
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4.2. Congestion game with tolls setup. One approach for equilibrium ma-
nipulation is to inﬂuence drivers’ utilities with tolls [21]. In a congestion game with
tolls, a driver’s utility takes on the form
Ui(a) = −
∑
r∈ai
cr(σr(a)) + tr(σr(a)),
where tr(k) is the toll imposed on route r if there are k users.
Suppose that the global planner is interested in minimizing the total congestion
experienced by all drivers on the network, which can be evaluated as
Tc(a) :=
∑
r∈R
σr(a)cr(σr(a)).
It has been shown that there exists a set of tolls such that the potential function
associated with the congestion game with tolls is aligned with the total congestion
experienced by all drivers on the network (see [15, Proposition 4.1]).
Proposition 4.1. Consider a congestion game of any network topology. If the
imposed tolls are set as
tr(k) = (k − 1)[cr(k)− cr(k − 1)] ∀k ≥ 1,
then the total negative congestion experienced by all drivers, φc(a) = −Tc(a), is a
potential function for the congestion game with tolls.
This tolling scheme results in drivers’ local utility functions being aligned with
the global objective of minimal total congestion.
Now suppose that the global planner is interested in minimizing a more general
measure,4
(4.1) φ(a) :=
∑
r∈R
fr(σr(a))cr(σr(a)),
where fr : {0, 1, 2, . . .} → R is any arbitrary function. An example of an objective
function that ﬁts within this framework and may be practical for general resource
allocation problems is
φ(a) =
∑
r∈R
cr(σr(a)).
We will now show that there exists a set of tolls, tr(·), such that the potential
function associated with the congestion game with tolls will be aligned with the global
planner’s objective function of the form given in (4.1).
Proposition 4.2. Consider a congestion game of any network topology. If the
imposed tolls are set as
tr(k) = (fr(k)− 1)cr(k)− fr(k − 1)cr(k − 1) ∀k ≥ 1,
then the global planners objective, φc(a) = −φ(a), is a potential function for the
congestion game with tolls.
4In fact, if cr(σr(a)) = 0 for all a, then (4.1) is equivalent to
∑
r∈R fr(σr(a)).
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Proof. Let a1 = {a1i , a−i} and a2 = {a2i , a−i}. We will use the shorthand notation
σa
1
r to represent σr(a1). The change in utility incurred by driver di in changing from
route a2i to route a
1
i is
Ui(a1)− Ui(a2) = −
∑
r∈a1i
(
cr(σa
1
r ) + tr(σ
a1
r )
)
+
∑
r∈a2i
(
cr(σa
2
r ) + tr(σ
a2
r )
)
= −
∑
r∈a1i\a2i
(
cr(σa
1
r ) + tr(σ
a1
r )
)
+
∑
r∈a2i\a1i
(
cr(σa
2
r ) + tr(σ
a2
r )
)
.
The change in the total negative congestion from the joint action a2 to a1 is
φc(a1)− φc(a2) = −
∑
r∈(a1i∪a2i )
(
fr(σa
1
r )cr(σ
a1
r )− fr(σa
2
r )cr(σ
a2
r )
)
.
Since ∑
r∈(a1i∩a2i )
(
fr(σa
1
r )cr(σ
a1
r )− fr(σa
2
r )cr(σ
a2
r )
)
= 0,
the change in the total negative congestion is
φc(a1)− φc(a2)
= −
∑
r∈a1i\a2i
(
fr(σa
1
r )cr(σ
a1
r )− fr(σa
2
r )cr(σ
a2
r )
)
−
∑
r∈a2i\a1i
(
fr(σa
1
r )cr(σ
a1
r )− fr(σa
2
r )cr(σ
a2
r )
)
.
Expanding the ﬁrst term, we obtain∑
r∈a1i\a2i
(
fr(σa
1
r )cr(σ
a1
r )− fr(σa
2
r )cr(σ
a2
r )
)
=
∑
r∈a1i\a2i
(
fr(σa
1
r )cr(σ
a1
r )− (fr(σa
1
r − 1))cr(σa
1
r − 1)
)
=
∑
r∈a1i\a2i
(
fr(σa
1
r )cr(σ
a1
r )− ((fr(σa
1
r )− 1)cr(σa
1
r )− tr(σa
1
r ))
)
=
∑
r∈a1i\a2i
(
cr(σa
1
r ) + tr(σ
a1
r )
)
.
Therefore,
φc(a1)− φc(a2) = −
∑
r∈a1i\a2i
(
cr(σa
1
r ) + tr(σ
a1
r )
)
+
∑
r∈a2i\a1i
(
cr(σa
2
r ) + tr(σ
a2
r )
)
= Ui(a1)− Ui(a2).
By implementing the tolling scheme set forth in Proposition 4.2, we guarantee
that all action proﬁles that minimize the global planner’s objective are equilibrium of
the congestion game with tolls.
In the special case that fr(σr(a)) = σr(a), Proposition 4.2 produces the same
tolls as Proposition 4.1.
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5. Illustrative example—congestion game. We will consider a discrete rep-
resentation of the congestion game setup considered in Braess’ paradox [3]. In our
setting, there are 1000 vehicles that need to traverse through the network. The net-
work topology and associated congestion functions are illustrated in Figure 6. Each
vehicle can select one of the four possible paths to traverse across the network.
c(k) = 1
c(k) = 1c(k) = k / 1000
c(k) = 0
c(k) = k / 1000
Start Finish
Fig. 6. Congestion game setup.
The reason for using this setup as an illustration of the learning algorithms and
equilibrium manipulation approach developed in this paper is that the Nash equi-
librium of this particular congestion game is easily identiﬁable. The unique Nash
equilibrium is when all vehicles take the route as highlighted in Figure 7. At this
Nash equilibrium each vehicle has a utility of 2 and the total congestion is 2000.
c(k) = 1
c(k) = 1c(k) = k / 1000
c(k) = 0
c(k) = k / 1000
Fig. 7. Illustration of Nash equilibrium in proposed congestion game.
Since a potential game is weakly acyclic, the payoﬀ-based learning dynamics in
this paper are applicable learning algorithms for this congestion game. In a congestion
game, a payoﬀ-based learning algorithm means that drivers have access only to the
actual congestion experienced. Drivers are unaware of the congestion level on any
alternative routes. Figure 8 shows the evolution of drivers on routes when using
the simple experimentation dynamics. This simulation used an experimentation rate
of  = 0.25%. One can observe that the vehicles’ collective behavior does indeed
approach that of the Nash equilibrium.
In this congestion game, it is also easy to verify that this vehicle distribution does
not minimize the total congestion experience by all drivers over the network. The
distribution that minimizes the total congestion over the network is when half the
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Fig. 8. Evolution of number of vehicles on each road using simple experimentation dynamics:
the number of vehicles on the roads highlighted by arrows approaches 1000 while the number of
vehicles on all remaining roads approaches 0.
vehicles occupy the top two roads and the other half occupy the bottom two roads.
The middle road is irrelevant.
One can employ the tolling scheme developed in the previous section to locally
inﬂuence vehicle behavior to achieve this objective. In this setting, the new cost
functions, i.e., congestion plus tolls, are illustrated in Figure 9.
c(k) = 1
c(k) = 1
c(k) = k / 1000 +
(k-1) / 1000
c(k) = 0
c(k) = k / 1000 +
(k-1) / 1000
Fig. 9. Congestion game setup with tolls to minimize total congestion.
Figure 10 shows the evolution of drivers on routes when using the simple exper-
imentation dynamics. This simulation used an experimentation rate of  = 0.25%.
When using this tolling scheme, the vehicles’ collective behavior approaches the new
Nash equilibrium which now minimizes the total congestion experienced on the net-
work. The total congestion experienced on the network is now approximately 1500.
There are other tolling schemes that would have resulted in the desired allocation.
One approach is to assign an inﬁnite cost to the middle road, which is equivalent to
removing it from the network. Under this scenario, the unique Nash equilibrium is
for half the vehicles to occupy the top route and the other half to occupy the bottom,
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Fig. 10. Evolution of number of vehicles on each road using simple experimentation dynamics
with optimal tolls: the number of vehicles on the middle road fluctuates around 500 while the number
of vehicles on all remaining roads stabilizes to around 500.
which would minimize the total congestion on the network. Therefore, the existence of
this extra road, even though it has zero cost, resulted in the unique Nash equilibrium
having a higher total congestion. This is Braess’ paradox [3].
The advantage of the tolling scheme set forth in this paper is that it gives a
systematic method for inﬂuencing the Nash equilibria of any congestion game. We
would like to highlight that this tolling scheme guarantees only that the action proﬁles
that maximize the desired objective function are Nash equilibria of the new conges-
tion game with tolls. However, it does not guarantee the lack of suboptimal Nash
equilibria.
In many applications, players may not have access to their true utility, but do
have access to a noisy measurement of their utility. For example, in the traﬃc setting,
this noisy measurement could be the result of accidents or weather conditions. We
will revisit the original congestion game (without tolls) as illustrated in Figure 6. We
will now assume that a driver’s utility measurement takes on the form
U˜i(a) = −
∑
r∈ai
cr(σr(a)) + νi,
where νi is a random variable with zero mean and variance of 0.1. We will assume
that the noise is driver speciﬁc rather than road speciﬁc.
Figure 11 shows a comparison of the evolution of drivers on routes when using the
simple and sample experimentation dynamics. The simple experimentation dynamics
simulation used an experimentation rate  = 0.25%. The sample experimentation
dynamics simulation used an exploration rate  = 0.25%, a tolerance level δ = 0.002,
an exploration phase length m = 500000, and inertia ω = 0.85. As expected, the noisy
utility measurements inﬂuenced vehicle behavior more in the simple experimentation
dynamics than the sample experimentation dynamics.
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Fig. 11. Comparison of evolution of number of vehicles on each road using simple experimenta-
tion dynamics and sample experimentation dynamics (baseline) with noisy utility measurements: the
number of vehicles on the route (upper left, middle, lower right) dominates the number of vehicles
on all remaining roads in both settings.
6. Concluding remarks. We have introduced safe experimentation dynam-
ics for identical interest games, simple experimentation dynamics for weakly acyclic
games with noise-free utility measurements, and sample experimentation dynamics
for weakly acyclic games with noisy utility measurements. For all three settings, we
have shown that for suﬃciently large times, the joint action taken by all players will
constitute a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we have shown how to guarantee that a
collective objective in a congestion game is a (nonunique) Nash equilibrium. An im-
portant, but unaddressed, topic in this work is characterizing resulting convergence
rates. It is likely that tools regarding mixing times of Markov chains [17] will be
relevant.
Our motivation has been that in many engineered systems, the functional forms of
utility functions are not available, and so players must adjust their strategies through
an adaptive process using only payoﬀ measurements. In the dynamic processes de-
ﬁned here, there is no explicit cooperation or communication between players. On the
one hand, this lack of explicit coordination oﬀers an element of robustness to a vari-
ety of uncertainties in the strategy adjustment processes. Nonetheless, on the other
hand, an interesting future direction would be to investigate to what degree explicit
coordination through limited communications could be beneﬁcial.
Appendix. Background on resistance trees. For a detailed review of the
theory of resistance trees, please see [24].
Let P 0 denote the probability transition matrix for a ﬁnite state Markov chain
over the state space Z. Consider a “perturbed” process such that the size of the
perturbations can be indexed by a scalar  > 0, and let P  be the associated transition
probability matrix. The process P  is called a regular perturbed Markov process if P 
is ergodic for all suﬃciently small  > 0 and P  approaches P 0 at an exponentially
smooth rate [24]. Speciﬁcally, the latter condition means that for all z, z′ ∈ Z,
lim
→0+
P zz′ = P
0
zz′ ,
and
P zz′ > 0 for some  > 0 ⇒ 0 < lim
→0+
P zz′
r(z→z′)
< ∞
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for some nonnegative real number r(z → z′), which is called the resistance of the
transition z → z′. (Note in particular that if P 0zz′ > 0, then r(z → z′) = 0.)
Let the recurrence classes of P 0 be denoted by E1, E2, . . . , EN . For each pair of
distinct recurrence classes Ei and Ej , i = j, an ij-path is deﬁned to be a sequence
of distinct states ζ = (z1 → z2 → · · · → zn) such that z1 ∈ Ei and zn ∈ Ej .
The resistance of this path is the sum of the resistances of its edges, that is, r(ζ) =
r(z1 → z2) + r(z2 → z3) + · · · + r(zn−1 → zn). Let ρij = min r(ζ) be the least
resistance over all ij-paths ζ. Note that ρij must be positive for all distinct i and j,
because there exists no path of zero resistance between distinct recurrence classes.
Now construct a complete directed graph with N vertices, one for each recurrence
class. The vertex corresponding to class Ej will be called j. The weight on the directed
edge i → j is ρij . A tree, T , rooted at vertex j, also called a j-tree, is a set of N − 1
directed edges such that, from every vertex diﬀerent from j, there is a unique directed
path in the tree to j. The resistance of a rooted tree, T , is the sum of the resistances
ρij on the N −1 edges that compose it. The stochastic potential, γj , of the recurrence
class Ej is deﬁned to be the minimum resistance over all trees rooted at j. The
following theorem gives a simple criterion for determining the stochastically stable
states (see [24, Theorem 4]).
Theorem A.1. Let P  be a regular perturbed Markov process, and for each  > 0
let μ be the unique stationary distribution of P . Then lim→0 μ exists and the
limiting distribution μ0 is a stationary distribution of P 0. The stochastically stable
states (i.e., the support of μ0) are precisely those states contained in the recurrence
classes with minimum stochastic potential.
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